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Abstract 
We investigate the effects of economic crises on the subsequent economic performance, 
economic reform, democratization and institutional change. Our analysis is based on a sample 
of post-communist countries, most of which experienced severe economic crises during the 
1990s. We find that the severity of crisis has had a positive impact on the subsequent pace of 
economic reform, economic growth and, with a delay, on investment and institutional change. 
Episode of high inflation, moreover, translate into lower subsequent inflation. Crises thus 
serve as catalysts of reform and institutional change and lead to better long-term economic 
performance.  
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1 Introduction 
Why do countries undertake systemic reforms of their economies? An important motivation is 
the desire and need to improve the wellbeing of their citizens. However, while the long-term 
outcome of economic reforms is uncertain, they are typically associated with substantial costs 
and economic hardship in the short run (Roland, 2000, chapters 2 and 3). As a result, 
efficiency-enhancing reforms may be rejected by the voters even if they are expected to 
benefit the majority of them (Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991; Rodrik, 1999). Alternatively, the 
required reforms may get postponed inefficiently long, thus prolonging the economic 
inefficiency that precedes them (Alesina and Drazen, 1991).  
Alesina and Drazen (1991) make an intriguing proposition based on these stylized facts. 
They argue that reforms are postponed because they are preceded by a war of attrition over 
the distribution of their costs. As long as the economic situation is bearable, the cost of reform 
could be imposed only on specific segments of the society: a moderate fiscal stabilization, for 
example, can be achieved by increasing taxes, lowering redistributive transfers, or laying off 
some civil servants. Each of those groups has much at stake and will therefore oppose the 
reform if it places the brunt of the cost on them and favor it otherwise. The economic situation 
then worsens progressively until, for one of the parties concerned, the cost of postponing the 
reform any further exceeds the cost of implementing it. That group then accepts to bear a 
disproportionate share of the burden and the reform can get underway. They observe, for 
example, that it is typically easier to drum up wide-spread political support for a stabilization 
program when inflation reaches hyperinflationary proportions but not during the preceding 
(often long) period of moderately high inflation. In other words, reform only gets 
implemented when the underlying situation reaches crisis proportions and becomes 
unsustainable: things have to get really bad before they can start getting better.  
This ‘crises beget reforms’ hypothesis has received some empirical support. Bruno and 
Easterly (1996, 1998) find that growth accelerates following high-inflation crises and that 
crisis-stricken countries tend to stabilize inflation, liberalize and open up their economies and 
privatize public assets. Drazen and Easterly (2001), similarly, find that extreme values of 
inflation and black-market premiums tend to be followed by more dramatic improvements in 
subsequent performance than moderate ones. Drazen and Easterly consider also the effect of 
growth crises but fail to find any evidence that they foster subsequent improvements. In 
contrast, Pitlik and Wirth (2003), who consider both growth and inflation crises, find that 
deep crises of either type foster subsequent economic reform whereas moderate crises have 
little or no effect. Lora and Olivera (2004) find that crises indeed appear to make reforms 
more likely in Latin America. Cavallo and Cavallo (2010), finally, argue that the 
macroeconomic effect of crises depends on the prevailing institution: in democratic countries, 
the negative effect of crises on growth is less severe than in non-democratic countries.  
Crises can also have important political repercussions. The economic and political 
changes in Eastern Europe during the 1990s and the recent Arab Spring in the Middle East 
alike were, to a large extent, precipitated by the failures of the incumbent regimes to maintain 
and improve the wellbeing of their citizens. Nevertheless, crises also can hinder reform. The 
studies of voting behavior in post-communist countries find that economic contractions 
undermine support for pro-reform parties and may lead to such parties being voted out of 
office (Fidrmuc, 2000 a,b; Jackson, Klich and Poznańska, 2001; Tucker, 2002). Such political 
reversals, in turn, may allow the winners of partial reform to capture the government and stall 
the reform momentum (Hellman, 1998). This suggests that there is indeed a thin line between 
vicious and virtuous crises (Krueger, 1993): some crises generate political consensus in favor 
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of reform while others instead lead to the reform being abandoned.  
We contribute to this growing and exciting literature by exploring the effect of crises on a 
broad range of outcomes, both economic and political. One issue in this respect is that 
episodes of crises and fundamental reforms are relatively rare. Therefore, rather than address 
this question in a large data set with only relatively few observations of crises or reform, we 
focus on a sample that is rich both in reform and crisis episodes: the post-communist 
countries. These countries were all characterized by a high degree of government interference 
in their economies, high to exclusive public ownership of productive assets and high to 
complete central control over prices. All experienced deteriorating economic performance in 
the course of the 1980s which eventually lead to (attempted) systemic reforms in the early 
1990s. There was, however, substantial variation in terms of reforms implemented and their 
outcomes. Some countries implemented ambitious reforms early on and, in a space of a few 
years, managed to achieve Western-style democratic regimes and market-economy systems. 
Others muddled through, reversed previously implemented reforms and/or suffered state 
capture by interest groups. In terms of growth, some countries experienced relatively mild 
recessions and started recovering after 2-5 years (Poland, Czech Republic but also 
Uzbekistan). Other post-communist countries saw their output falling by as much as two-
thirds (Moldova, Tajikistan) or even three quarters (Georgia) of the pre-transition level, with 
the recession lasting in some cases as long as a decade. While most transition economies 
experienced episodes of high inflation, some managed to bring inflation under control 
quickly; others suffered protracted periods of high inflation or hyperinflation.  
We use this variation in the severity of transition-induced crises as well as in the economic 
and institutional outcomes to analyze the legacy of crises. The scope of our analysis is thus 
broader than any of the previous contributions. We identify crises both as taking the shape of 
economic contractions and high inflation. In turn, we consider the effect of crises on the 
subsequent economic reform, democratization, multiple measures of economic performance 
and institutional change.  
After briefly introducing the data in the following section, section 3 presents the results of 
our analysis of the impact of crises on economic liberalization, growth, investments, inflation 
and institutional change and section 4 summarizes our findings.  
 
2 Data 
Our analysis covers all post-communist countries for which data are available. Altogether, we 
consider 29 countries3 that used to belong to the Soviet zone of influence, including the 
former constituent republics of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, over the 
period from 1990 to 2008. The starting point is limited by data availability: little information 
on these countries is available for the earlier years. Furthermore, the reforms we consider 
were mostly initiated after 1990 (the main exception is former Yugoslavia which experienced 
limited and partial reforms already during the 1980s). We include data through to 2008 so as 
to eliminate the current economic crisis. The aftermath of the current crisis is not revealed yet 
so that including it could confound our results on the effects of the earlier transition-induced 
crises.  
To capture the progress in implementing market-oriented reforms, we use the average of 
                                                 
3 Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Monte Negro, 
Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.  
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the eight progress-in-transition indicator compiled and published annually by the EBRD.4 We 
exploit the World Bank Development Indicators 2009 as the source of all macroeconomic 
variables, except for unemployment rates which we obtained from the EBRD Transition 
Reports (various issues). We use the average Freedom House democracy index5 and 
Kaufmann and al.’s (2009) governance indicators to take account of the progress in political 
and institutional transitions. Finally, we code whether countries were engaged in military 
conflict (external or internal) based on the Correlates of War (2010) dataset.   
The starting point of our analysis is to identify and measure the severity of the transition-
induced recession in post-communist countries. The immediate causes of the recession were 
multiple: disruption of trade with the Eastern Block countries that was only slowly counter-
balanced by growing trade with the West, price liberalization which translated repressed 
inflation to open inflation and the resulting fall in consumption, privatization of state-owned 
enterprises and the hardening of the budget constraints, resulting in falling employment, 
disorganization due to disruption of traditional business ties between the formerly state-owned 
firms, and so on (see Kornai, 1994, and Roland, 2000, and the references therein).  
The transformational recession manifested itself most visibly in falling output and rapidly 
rising prices.6 We therefore base our crisis measures on the trajectories of output and inflation 
since the outset of reform. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the outcomes experienced by the post-
communist countries: Figure 1 depicts the index of overall GDP in each year as percentage of 
the 1989 value, while Figure 2 displays the cumulative price level increase, with each data 
point showing the multiple of the initial price level (so that a value of 2 corresponds to 100 
percent cumulative inflation). It is not possible to identify individual countries in either 
Figure. Instead, they are intended to indicate the range of outcomes observed in our data. 
Virtually all counties experienced an output fall along a J-shaped trajectory (see Figure 1): the 
initial contraction was followed by a recovery, in some cases after considerable delay, 
however. The country with the deepest output fall is Bosnia-Herzegovina, whose output fell to 
13.5 percent of the 1989 level by 1992, followed by Georgia (23.5 percent in 1994); both 
countries were affected by internal conflicts. The best outcome is reported by Turkmenistan 
(output rising to 226 percent by 2008), followed by Poland (201 percent). The initiation of 
economic reform was associated with an upsurge of in all post-communist countries (Figure 
2). The range of outcomes varies widely, however: the average price level has increased 4.5 
times in the Czech Republic by 2008 while it rose to 1.3 billion times the original level in 
Serbia  
To reflect this diversity of transformational recessions in our analysis, we construct 
measures of the cumulative output fall (in percent) and cumulative price increase since 1989. 
For both measures, we are interested only in the crisis part of the evolution of the output and 
price levels. Therefore, we only consider the overall contraction of output and not the 
subsequent recovery. In other words, once output reaches the bottom of its post-1989 
                                                 
4 These indicators measure each country’s progress in the following fields: price liberalization, foreign exchange 
and trade liberalization, small scale privatization, large scale privatization, enterprise reform, competition policy, 
banking reform and non-banking financial institutions. Each indicators ranges from 1 (unreformed centrally-
planned economy) to 4+ (liberal market economy). As is common in this  literature, we replace plus and minus 
distinctions  by adding and subtracting 0.33 (so that 4+ becomes 4.33 while 4- is 3.67). We do not use the more 
recently available EBRD indicators of infrastructure reform, only the eight original indicators measuring 
progress in Washington-consensus reform (liberalization, stabilization and privatization).  
5 Specifically, this index is the average of the Freedom House measures of political freedoms and civil liberties, 
rescaled so that higher values correspond to more democracy. It ranges between 1 (autocracy) to 7 (fully free).  
6 Unemployment could be a third manifestation of the crisis but it is less reliable because countries often use 
different definitions to measure it.  
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trajectory, we keep the cumulative output fall at the level attained at this lowest point.7 The 
cumulative inflation measure is constructed in a similar way: it an index of the overall 
cumulative price increase since 1989 (i.e. value of 2 corresponds to a doubling of the price 
level, 10 implies a ten-fold increase in prices, etc.). Once inflation has been stabilized, the 
index again stays at the level attained at the time of stabilization. We define stabilization as 
inflation of 80% pa or lower: most countries in our data set succeed in controlling inflation 
after it has been brought down to two-digit levels. 
Our objective is to see whether the severity of transition-induced recession has had a 
lasting impact on the subsequent pace of market-oriented reform, economic performance and 
other outcomes of interest. The cumulative inflation variable similarly captures the legacy of 
high inflation in the past even after run-away inflation has been stopped. Once the crisis is 
over, these variables no longer vary over time. Therefore, we construct a “time after crisis” 
variable which takes the value 0 during the crisis, and becomes a time trend thereafter. We 
interact this time variable with the output fall and cumulative inflation variables to test 
whether the effect of the crisis diminishes or strengthens over time.  
 
3 Long-term Effect of Crises  
First, we consider the impact of output fall on the progress in implementing market 
oriented reform. The results are presented in Table 1. The dependent variable is the speed of 
reform, proxied by the first difference in the average of eight EBRD progress-in-transition 
indicators. Each regression includes the lagged level of this index to account for the past level 
of reform: holding everything else constant, a country can implement more reform if its 
starting level of reform is low. We also include the lagged level of the average Freedom 
House democracy index to account for the possible reform-fostering effect of democratization 
(Fidrmuc, 2003), and a dummy for countries experiencing a military conflict. Except for the 
war dummy, all independent variables are lagged in order to avoid potential endogeneity 
problems. All regressions contain fixed effects panel regressions.8  
Column (1) presents the most parsimonious specification. We find that the lagged reform 
index has negative influence on reform: this is not surprising given that the reform index is 
bound from above. The past level of democracy, on the other hand, fosters economic reform: 
countries that undertake political liberalization also tend to engage in more ambitious 
economic reform. Not surprisingly, countries affected by war make less progress with respect 
to reform. Finally, the primary variable of interest, output fall, is positive and highly 
significant: countries that experienced a deeper contraction, ceteris paribus, respond to this by 
accelerating economic reform. It is possible, however, that this effect is found only because 
output fall is correlated with some other influential variable. In column (2), we therefore 
replace output fall with lagged per-capita GDP (in thousands of PPP US dollars) to capture 
the effect of the level of economic development on the progress in reform. Its effect is 
negative and significant: richer countries implement less reform. However, when we include 
both output fall and GDP per person side by side in column (3), only the output fall remains 
significant while GDP per capita now has no effect on reform. In column (4), we add lagged 
                                                 
7 In several cases, a country in question experienced a double-dip recession. One example is Russia where output 
initially started to recover in 1997 only to fall further in 1998 following its economic and financial crisis. In that 
case, we consider the deeper dip out of the two as the bottom of the transformational recession (the second dip in 
1998 in Russian case).  
8 In addition, dynamic panel models with fixed effects such as those that we estimate here can result in dynamic 
bias. However, results obtained with GMM are very similar to those presented here.  
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inflation (in logs to reduce the influence of episodes of extremely high inflation). Its effect is 
positive and significant: a recent experience of high inflation helps accelerate reforms. Yet, 
the effect of output fall remains strongly significant and essentially unchanged. Finally, the 
last column introduces the quadratic polynomial of time since the end of crisis: on its own and 
interacted with the output fall.9 The quadratic time trend can potentially capture the time-
specific profile of reform while the interaction term between time and output fall will show 
whether the effect of crises on subsequent reform strengthens or diminishes over time. None 
of these variables are significant, however: the effect of crises on reform does not appear to 
vary over time.  
Next, in Table 2, we consider the effect of crises on the first differences of the individual 
EBRD sub-indexes. These regressions replicate column (4) of Table 1, except the dependent 
variable and the lagged index of reform now is the sub-index denoted in the heading of each 
column. The results are remarkably consistent across the eight sub-indexes and are similar to 
those obtained with the average index: lagged sub-index of reform has a negative effect, 
lagged democracy has a positive effect and output fall again displays a positive and strongly 
significant effect on subsequent progress in reform. Hence, having experienced a crisis in the 
past stimulates progress across all aspects of the reform program. While the coefficients 
estimated for the various sub-indexes are quite similar to each other (and to the result reported 
in column 4 of Table 1), the crisis effect is particularly pronounced for the removal of price 
controls, liberalization of foreign trade and small-scale privatization.  
So far, we have shown that having experienced a crisis fosters economic reform. 
Inasmuch as economic reform improves economic policy making, the legacy of a crisis 
should, indirectly, improve economic performance too. We therefore turn, in Table 3, to 
investigating whether crises affect economic performance also directly. The dependent 
variable is the growth rate of per-capita GDP. Each regression controls again for the lagged 
reform index. We also include the investment to GDP ratio and control again for military 
conflicts. Reform progress, as expected, has a positive coefficient: countries that have 
implemented more ambitious reform are rewarded by faster growth. Somewhat surprisingly, 
investment is never significant. Military conflicts impose a heavy penalty on economic 
performance. Importantly, past output contraction translates into faster subsequent growth. 
This effect is robust to controlling for the economic convergence effect by including the 
lagged GDP per person (which appears with a negative coefficient, as is standard in the 
growth literature, but its coefficient is not significant when included alongside the output fall, 
see columns 2 and 3) and inflation (which lowers growth, see column 4). Finally, in column 
(5), we again introduce the quadratic polynomial of time since end of crisis and its 
interactions with output fall. The quadratic time trend is not significant but the interaction 
terms are. Specifically, we observe an inverted U-shaped pattern: the positive effect of the 
crisis initially strengthens but eventually declines again.10  
In Tables 4 and 5, we consider the effect of output fall on investment to GDP ratio and the 
ratio of inward FDI to GDP. Investment is an important determinant of growth (even though 
the preceding set of regressions failed to confirm this for our set of countries). FDI, besides 
bringing in additional capital into the country, can also be associated with important 
technological spillovers. The regressions follow similar structure as those in the preceding 
                                                 
9 We also test for non linear effect of output fall itself by introducing it in quadratic form but it was insignificant. 
This result is available upon request.  
10 We also introduce a quadratic term of output fall and find a U shaped relationship between output fall and 
growth. However, the minimum of the function stands at 13.1, which is below the lowest observed output fall in 
our sample (Belarus in 1992 with an output fall of 13.35). Therefore, output fall has always a positive effect on 
growth.   
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Tables. Again, the lagged reform index has a strong positive effect on investment and also on 
FDI (although the coefficient estimated for the latter is not always significant). The effect of 
past crises, however, now appears significantly negative: having had a crisis in the past 
discourages both domestic investment and inflow of investment from abroad. For investment, 
however, this is counteracted by a positive time-varying effect of past crises, as reflected in 
the positive interaction between output fall and time since crisis. Hence, investment declines 
in the aftermath of crises but then catches up later.  
Table 6 considers the effect of crises on inflation, which is never significant. Hence, 
crises, at least inasmuch as they are manifested in economic contractions, do not affect the 
subsequent inflation (we consider the effect of high-inflation episodes on subsequent inflation 
below).  
As discussed in the introduction, crises may also affect political developments and the 
quality of institutions. In particular, the adverse economic effects of crises may translate into a 
political backlash against economic reform and increased support for populist and 
authoritarian-minded parties (see Fidrmuc, 2000 a,b; Jackson, Klich and Poznańska, 2001; 
Tucker, 2002). This is in line with the stylized facts cited by Przeworski (2005) who observes 
that democracies tend to be very fragile and vulnerable to regime change in relatively poor 
countries (see also Hellman, 1998). Given that most post-communist countries were relatively 
poor at the time they initiated their economic reforms, it is indeed possible that the severity of 
the crises they experienced could account for the (partial) reversals of political reform that 
some of them undertook: the most notable examples are Belarus and Turkmenistan; Russia 
likewise has reverted to (moderately) authoritarian rule during the Putin-Medvedev era.  
In Table 7, we therefore consider the impact of past crises on democratization as measured 
by the average of indexes of political freedoms and civil liberties reported by the Freedom 
House. The dependent variable is the first difference of this measure and the regressions 
control also for the lagged level of democracy. Since we found earlier that crises translate into 
faster economic reform and that democratization also correlates with economic reform, we 
could expect a positive effect. In contrast, the discussion in the preceding paragraph would 
suggest that the effect should be negative rather than positive. The regression results support 
the latter prediction: the deeper the crisis, the slower the subsequent democratization process. 
This effect is robust to including GDP per capita (which has a positive, although not always 
significant, effect on democratization) and inflation (which slows down democratization) as 
well as other variables. Hence, crises discourage democratization and this effect goes beyond 
to what can be ascribed to the transition-induced recession and inflation. We again allow the 
effect to vary over time but the interaction terms are not significant.11  
To further explore the effect of crises on institutional quality, we use the governance 
indicators constructed by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2009). Kaufmann et al. aggregate 
information from a host of other sources on the quality of institutions in six areas: control of 
corruption, voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality, and rule of law. The indicators are constructed so that higher values always 
correspond to better institutions. Their coverage, however, is limited: the indicators are 
available at semi-annual frequency from 1996 to 2000 and then annually from 2002. Because 
of this, we are unable to use lags of these variables: we therefore use lags of both economic 
reform (EBRD) and democracy (Freedom House) indexes instead (Table 8).12 Both of these 
                                                 
11 Nevertheless, when we introduce a quadratic term of the output fall to allow for nonlinearity. we find a U-
shaped effect, with the minimum attained for output fall reaching 39.5 percent (results available upon request).  
12 Note that as the indicators are not available before 1996, the early transition period is dropped from the 
analysis.  
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indexes are positive; the effect of economic reform is always strongly significant while that of 
democracy is significantly positive in three regressions out of six. There are thus important 
spillovers from economic policy and democratization to institutional quality. The effect of 
past crises, however, is never significant. Yet, the time-varying effect is U-shaped, with the 
quadratic term always significant. This implies that although past crises may initially lead to a 
worsening of institutions in the short term, this is followed by an improvement later on: when 
it comes to crises, good things come to those who wait.  
Finally, economic crises tend to be manifested not only in output contractions but also in 
high inflation. We therefore replace the output-fall measure of crises with the cumulative 
inflation. All regressions, reported in Table 9, again control for the level of the reform index 
(which is not consistently significant) and for being involved in a military conflict (not 
surprisingly, wars are associated with much higher inflation). We also include the output fall 
and GDP per capita: neither appears significant as a determinant of inflation. However, 
cumulative inflation is significantly negative in every regression: having a legacy of high 
inflation in the past exerts a negative effect on subsequent price growth. This stands in 
contrast with the insignificant effect of output fall: when it comes to inflation, countries learn 
a lesson from past high-inflation episodes but not from recessions.  
 
4 Conclusions 
In this paper, we investigate the effect of crises on economic reforms, economic performance, 
democratization and institutional change. To this effect, we utilize the experience of the post-
communist countries, virtually all of which experienced crises (extraordinarily severe crises in 
some cases) following the demise of communism and central planning in the early 1990s. Our 
results suggest that crises indeed serve as a catalyst for reforms: history of having experienced 
a crisis in the past is associated with greater economic reform and better institutions (although 
the institutional improvement only occurs with a delay). Crises also translate into better 
economic performance: they are followed by higher growth, lower inflation and, with a delay, 
higher investment. Our results thus offer support for the ‘crises beget reform’ hypothesis put 
forward by Alesina and Drazen (1991). Importantly, they suggest that the favorable effect of 
crises goes beyond accelerating economic reform: there are also positive repercussions for 
economic performance, political reform and institutional change.  
  8
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Table 1 Output Fall and Progress in Market-oriented Reform  
Dependent variable:  EBRD index (first difference) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
 Lagged EBRD 
index -0.278 -0.185 -0.302 -0.277 -0.297
 (0.014)** (0.012)** (0.017)** (0.019)** (0.022)**
Lagged Democracy  0.079 0.059 0.077 0.065 0.063
 (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.009)** (0.009)**
War -0.085 -0.108 -0.064 -0.104 -0.087
 (0.027)** (0.032)** (0.030)* (0.031)** (0.032)**
Lagged outputfall 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.005
 (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)**
Lagged gdp p.c.   -0.013 0.005 0.008 -0.006
 (thousands)  (0.004)** (0.004) (0.004)* (0.006)
Lagged inflation  0.013 0.019
  (0.004)** (0.005)**
Outputfall*time   0.0001
    (0.0002)
Outputfall*time²   -5.96e-06
    (1.68e-05)
Time after crisis   0.004
    (0.011)
Time after crisis²   0.000
    (0.001)
Constant 0.265 0.421 0.241 0.23 0.358
 (0.031)** (0.038)** (0.040)** (0.049)** (0.064)**
Observations 550 524 524 495 495 
Number of 
Countries 29 29 29 29 29 
R-squared 0.45 0.39 0.48 0.5 0.52 
All regressions include country‐specific fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses.  
Significance: * 5%; ** 1% 
 
  11 
Table 2 Output Fall and Sub-indexes of Progress in Market-oriented Reform 
Dependent variable: Large-scale Privatization 
Small-scale 
Privatization 
Enterprise 
Reform 
Price 
Controls 
Foreign 
Trade 
Competition 
Policy Banking 
Security 
Markets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Lagged EBRD -0.241 -0.309 -0.402 -0.524 -0.392 -0.286 -0.316 -0.270 
sub-index (0.025)** (0.022)** (0.030)** (0.034)** (0.028)** (0.029)** (0.030)** (0.028)** 
Lagged Democracy 0.073 0.089 0.102 0.077 0.079 0.060 0.095 0.057 
 (0.017)** (0.015)** (0.014)** (0.020)** (0.020)** (0.012)** (0.016)** (0.013)** 
War -0.127 -0.087 -0.137 -0.016 -0.264 -0.050 -0.110 0.022 
 (0.064)* (0.060) (0.052)** (0.081) (0.076)** (0.051) (0.058) (0.053) 
Lagged outputfall 0.006 0.011 0.008 0.013 0.013 0.005 0.009 0.005 
 (0.001)** (0.002)** (0.001)** (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** 
Lagged gdp p.c. -0.005 -0.006 0.017 0.015 0.006 0.022 0.022 0.018 
(thousands) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)** (0.009) (0.009) (0.006)** (0.007)** (0.007)** 
Lagged inflation 0.005 0.018 0.007 0.037 0.002 0.007 0.008 -0.008 
 (0.008) (0.007)* (0.006) (0.009)** (0.010) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
Constant 0.194 0.349 -0.002 0.977 0.547 0.009 -0.099 0.044 
 (0.102) (0.095)** (0.082) (0.130)** (0.121)** (0.080) (0.093) (0.083) 
Observations 495 495 495 495 495 495 495 495 
Number of 
Countries 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
R-squared 0.27 0.43 0.35 0.45 0.38 0.21 0.28 0.19 
All  regressions  include  country‐specific  fixed  effects.  Standard  errors  in parentheses.  Lagged  EBRD  sub‐index  is  the  same  index  as  that denoted  in  the 
column heading. Significance: * 5%; ** 1% 
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Table 3 Output Fall and Economic Growth 
Dependent variable: GDP p.c. growth rate 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lagged EBRD index 4.031 7.612 4.158 2.273 1.804
  (0.725)** (0.520)** (0.854)** (0.731)** (0.880)*
Lagged Investment 0.009 -0.063 0.018 -0.017 -0.018
  (0.058) (0.057) (0.058) (0.044) (0.046)
War -12.359 -14.932 -12.957 -9.455 -8.251
  (1.717)** (1.752)** (1.753)** (1.334)** (1.359)**
Lagged outputfall 0.246 0.248 0.327 0.259
  (0.043)** (0.049)** (0.040)** (0.042)**
Lagged gdp p.c.   -0.613 -0.134 -0.259 -0.480
  (thousands)  (0.182)** (0.201) (0.149) (0.233)*
Lagged inflation  -1.404 -1.001
   (0.162)** (0.185)**
Time*outputfall   0.027
    (0.010)**
Time²*outputfall   -0.002
     (0.001)*
Time after crisis   -0.239
    (0.424)
Time after crisis²   0.023
    (0.027)
Constant -16.473 -10.567 -16.062 -8.709 -7.236
  (1.819)** (1.849)** (2.109)** (1.932)** (2.536)**
Observations 505 503 503 479 479
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 29
R-squared 0.49 0.46 0.49 0.67 0.69
All regressions include country‐specific fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses.  
Significance: * 5%; ** 1% 
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Table 4 Output Fall and Investment 
Dependent variable Investment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lagged  EBRDindex 4.246 1.808 4.242 5.018 6.681
  (0.516)** (0.401)** (0.643)** (0.752)** (0.852)**
War -4.086 -3.383 -4.386 -4.333 -1.949
  (1.283)** (1.344)* (1.331)** (1.420)** (1.390)
Lagged outputfall -0.171 -0.171 -0.182 -0.205
  (0.028)** (0.036)** (0.041)** (0.042)**
Lagged gdp p.c.   0.562 0.148 0.115 0.021
   (thousands)  (0.142)** (0.164) (0.164) (0.243)
Lagged inflation  0.123 -0.025
   (0.174) (0.190)
outputfall*time   0.030
    (0.010)**
outputfall*time²   -0.001
    (0.001)
Time after crisis   -2.254
    (0.430)**
Time after crisis²   0.102
    (0.027)**
Constant 18.014 13.921 16.948 14.972 14.752
  (0.981)** (1.271)** (1.396)** (1.909)** (2.492)**
Observations 520 508 508 481 481
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 29
R-squared 0.15 0.12 0.16 0.19 0.29
All regressions include country‐specific fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses.  
Significance: * 5%; ** 1% 
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Table 5 Output Fall and Foreign Direct Investment Inflow 
Dependent variable: Foreign Direct Investment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lagged EBRD index 5.266 0.418 5.840 3.409 2.243
  (1.778)** (1.650) (2.229)** (2.758) (3.249)
War 11.273 17.804 13.285 14.052 14.632
  (4.439)* (4.487)** (4.607)** (4.952)** (5.215)**
Lagged outputfall -0.456 -0.523 -0.527 -0.581
  (0.123)** (0.147)** (0.154)** (0.162)**
Lagged gdp p.c.   0.721 -0.023 -0.096 -0.944
   (thousands)  (0.459) (0.499) (0.518) (0.824)
Lagged inflation  -0.995 -0.580
   (0.619) (0.727)
Outputfall*time   0.028
    (0.035)
Outputfall*time²   -0.002
    (0.002)
Time after crisis   -0.428
    (1.518)
Time after crisis²   0.088
    (0.095)
Constant 8.692 -1.327 9.772 19.631 25.971
  (4.492) (4.336) (5.295) (7.982)* (9.875)**
Observations 477 472 472 454 454
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 29
R-squared 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.08
All regressions include country‐specific fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses.  
Significance: * 5%; ** 1% 
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Table 6 Output Fall and Inflation  
Dependent variable: Inflation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lagged  EBRD index 4.104 51.012 139.601 1,060.744 
  (461.71) (393.82) (586.14) (742.235) 
War 4,552.84 5,083.95 5,040.40 4,149.849 
  (1,126.2)** (1,172.3)** (1,192.7)** (1,268.049)** 
Lagged outputfall 4.308 -6.22 24.121 
  (24.06) (30.46) (33.539) 
Lagged Gdp p.c.  -8.138 -23.865 253.472 
   (thousands) (128.2) (149.66) (231.440) 
Outputfall*time -7.128 
  (9.560) 
Outputfall*time² 0.362 
  (0.657) 
Time after crisis -183.630 
  (428.574) 
Time after crisis² 0.673 
  (27.677) 
Constant -21.855 73.299 189.697 -3,442.930 
  (944.906) (1,181.98) (1,313.27) (2,236.885) 
Observations 524 512 512 512 
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 
R-squared 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.06 
All regressions include country‐specific fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses.  
Significance: * 5%; ** 1% 
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Table 7 Output Fall and Democratization  
Dependent variable: Democracy (first difference) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lagged democracy -0.343 -0.376 -0.358 -0.366 -0.373
 (0.021)** (0.022)** (0.022)** (0.024)** (0.025)**
Lagged output fall -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.007
 (0.001)** (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.003)*
War -0.551 -0.397 -0.507 -0.381 -0.322
 (0.089)** (0.092)** (0.095)** (0.100)** (0.104)**
Lagged gdp p.c.   0.032 0.023 0.008 -0.011
  (thousands)  (0.010)** (0.010)* (0.011) (0.019)
Lagged inflation  -0.035 -0.034
  (0.011)** (0.014)*
Outputfall*time   0.001
    (0.001)
Outputfall*time²   -0.0001
    (0.0001)
Time after crisis   -0.062
    (0.031)*
Time after crisis²   0.004
    (0.002)*
Constant 1.810 1.538 1.759 1.966 2.158
  (0.101)** (0.110)** (0.123)** (0.157)** (0.206)**
Observations 551 525 525 496 496
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 29
R-squared 0.37 0.38 0.40 0.37 0.38
All regressions include country‐specific fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses.  
Significance: * 5%; ** 1% 
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Table 8 Output Fall and Quality of institutions 
Dependent variable: 
Control of 
Corruption 
Voice and 
Account-
ability 
Political 
Stability 
Gov 
Effective-
ness 
Regulatory 
Quality 
Rule of 
Law 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lagged EBRD index 0.155 0.192 0.340 0.313 0.270 0.144
 (0.085) (0.076)** (0.127)** (0.078)** (0.086)** (0.068)*
Lagged democracy 0.103 0.214 0.027 0.039 0.014 0.068
 (0.026)** (0.023)** (0.039) (0.024) (0.027) (0.021)**
Lagged output fall -0.006 -0.015 0.012 -0.009 0.004 -0.021
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.021) (0.013) (0.014) (0.011)
War -0.002 -0.183 -1.069 -0.148 -0.812 -0.198
  (0.204) (0.182) (0.304)** (0.189) (0.206)** (0.164)
Lagged gdp p.c.  0.038 -0.018 0.033 0.032 -0.016 0.052
  (thousands) (0.011) (0.010) (0.017)* (0.011)** (0.011) (0.009)**
Lagged inflation -0.052 -0.010 0.032 -0.007 -0.013 -0.004
  (log) (0.012) (.010) (0.017) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009)
Outputfall*time -0.0013 -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0020 -0.0011 -0.0006
  (0.0006)* (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0006)** (0.0006) (0.0004)
Outputfall*time² 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
  (0.0000)** (0.0000)* (0.0000)* (0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)**
Time after crisis 0.0348 0.026 -0.042 0.077 0.035 -0.018
  (0.0282) (0.025) (0.042) (0.026) (0.028) (0.023)
Time after crisis² -0.0053 -0.0023 -0.0007 -0.0058 -0.0019 -0.0027
 (0.0015)** (0.0014) (0.0023) (0.0014)** (0.0015) (0.0012)*
Constant -1.076 -0.828 -1.758 -1.099 -1.124 -0.294
 (0.628) (0.559) (0.935) (0.582) (0.633) (0.503)
Observations 278 278 278 278 278 278
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 29 29
R-squared 0.36 0.46 0.30 0.36 0.51 0.40
All regressions include country‐specific fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses.  
Significance: * 5%; ** 1% 
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Table 9 Cumulative Inflation and Subsequent Inflation 
 Inflation  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Lagged EBRD index 55.355 234.517 231.533 
 (484.589) (422.007) (619.201) 
War 3,839.13 4,217.13 4,219.20 
 (1,211.194)** (1,239.001)** (1,279.563)** 
Lagged outputfall 11.216  0.221 
 (26.885)  (33.533) 
Lagged gdp p.c.  -42.474 -41.971 
   (thousands)  (131.345) (152.015) 
Cumulated inflation  -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** 
Constant -92.201 148.483 144.648 
 (1,019.0) (1,237.3) (1,368.5) 
Observations 493 482 482 
Number of Countries 27 27 27 
R-squared 0.09 0.09 0.09 
All regressions include country‐specific fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses.  
Significance: * 5%; ** 1% 
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Figure 1 Output Fall 
 
Notes: Output fall measured as index of overall GDP with the 1989 level equal to 100.  
 
Figure 2 Cumulative Inflation  
 
Notes: Cumulative inflation measured as multiple of the starting level (logarithmic scale).  
 
